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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonas (f/k/a Sandra Jonas (R., p. 4)) appeals from a judgment on her latest filings.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Jonas pled guilty to second-degree murder, the district court imposed a sentence of
life with 25 years determinate, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed her judgment of
conviction and sentence in 2000. State v. Jonas, 2000 Unpublished Opinion No. 760,
Docket No. 26014, p. 1 (Idaho App., Dec. 15, 2000) (hereinafter “Jonas I,” copy attached).
The district court denied a subsequent motion to withdraw her guilty plea on the merits,
which the Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the district court lacked
jurisdiction. Jonas v. State, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 344, Docket No. 30875, pp. 23 (Idaho App., Jan. 30, 2006) (hereinafter “Jonas II,” copy attached). Jonas filed a petition
for post-conviction relief, which the district court summarily dismissed. Jonas v. State,
2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 428, Docket No. 35748, p. 2 (Idaho App., April 14, 2010)
(hereinafter “Jonas III,” copy attached). The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary
dismissal. Id. at pp. 2-6.
Jonas filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court
summarily dismissed. Jonas v. State, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 697, Docket No.
40382, p. 1 (Idaho App., October 3, 2013) (hereinafter “Jonas IV,” copy attached). The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because Jonas was provided insufficient notice
of the bases for dismissal. Id. at pp. 2-3. On remand the district court again summarily
dismissed the successive petition, which was affirmed on appeal. Jonas v. State, 2015
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Unpublished Opinion No. 605, Docket No. 42272, pp. 1-2 (Idaho App., August 31, 2015)
(hereinafter “Jonas V,” copy attached).
The district court provided the following procedural history on this case:
On December 1, 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition to vacate conviction
and sentence entered in underlying criminal matter and for the return of
certain property (“Petition”). On December 29, 2017, Petitioner filed a
petition for entry of default judgment in the same matter. The Court treated
the Petition as a petition for post-conviction relief and notified Petitioner
that, on its face, the Petition failed to meet the requirements of Idaho Code
§ 19-4901, et seq., and gave notice of its intent to dismiss. On March 9,
2018, Petitioner filed a response and request for appointment of counsel.
(R., p. 17 (compare R., pp. 2-3, 13-14).) The district court granted Jonas’ request to not
treat her petition as a (successive) petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 17-18.)
Because the matter was not being treated as an action in post-conviction relief, but rather
a separate civil claim against the State of Idaho, Jonas was not entitled to appointment of
counsel, was required to pay filing fees (which she had not done) and properly serve the
state (which she had also not done). (R., p. 18.) For these reasons, the district court denied
the motion for appointment of counsel, denied default, and dismissed the petition. (R., p.
18.) The district court entered judgment based on its order. (R., p. 15.) Jonas filed a
document titled, “Appeal for CV27-18-48” within 42 days of the entry of judgment. (R.,
p. 20.)
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ISSUE
Jonas provides no statement of the issues. The state presents the issue as:

Has Jonas failed to provide authority and therefore failed to present any issue
reviewable on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
Jonas Has Failed To Provide Authority And Therefore Failed To Present Any Issue
Reviewable On Appeal
“Where an appellant fails to assert his assignment of error with particularity and to
support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite
to be heard by the Court.” Litke v. Munkhoff, 163 Idaho 627, ___, 417 P.3d 224, 234
(2018) (quotations omitted). In addition, the Court “will not search the record on appeal
for error.” Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 409 P.3d 827, 831 (2018) (quotations omitted).
“‘When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument,
they will not be considered.’” In the Interest Of the Doe Children, 163 Idaho 367, 413 P.3d
767, 772 (2018) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).
Jonas makes several arguments on appeal, such as that she was coerced into
pleading guilty by a defense attorney in a conspiracy with the prosecution; that counsel did
not pursue self-defense, again because of the conspiracy with the prosecution; that the
police were “dirty” and part of the conspiracy; that a search warrant executed in Blaine and
Cassia counties was invalid (and therefore the property taken by the warrant was stolen
and should be returned); that another person committed the murder; and that the
prosecution should be required to prove her guilt. (Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 1-2.) The
Appellant’s brief on appeal contains no citations to authority or the record, makes no
cognizable legal argument, and is not supported by propositions of law. (Id.) Jonas’ claims
are “too indefinite to be heard by the Court.” Litke, 163 Idaho at ___, 417 P.3d at 234
(quotations omitted).
Even if considered on the merits, the arguments are frivolous. The district court,
after treating the petition as the initiation of a civil case and not a post-conviction action as
4

requested by Jonas, dismissed the case for failing to file the requisite filing fees. (R., p.
18.) Jonas does not challenge the district court’s stated basis for dismissal. (Petitioner’s
Brief.) Jonas has therefore failed to raise a possible claim of reversible error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of October, 2018, served two true
and correct paper copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing the copies
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
JONAS
IDOC #58811
POCATELLO WOMEN’S CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, UNIT 5
1451 FORE RD.
POCATELLO, ID 83205

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 26014

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
SANDRA JONAS,

_______________
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2000 Unpublished Opinion No. 760
Filed: December 15, 2000
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Jerome County. Hon. Monte B. Carlson, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and unified life sentence, with a minimum period of
confinement of twenty-five years, for second degree murder, affirmed; order
denying !.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.
Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate Public Defender; Paul S. Sonenberg, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

PERRY, Chief Judge
This is a sentence review. On July 23, 1999, Sandra Jonas pled guilty to one count of
second degree mw·der. LC. §§ 18-4001 to -4003. Jonas was originally charged with one count
of first degree murder, wherein the prosecutor provided notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
However, the charge was later reduced pursuant to a plea agreement. Jonas was sentenced to a
unified term of life, with a minimum period of confinement of twenty-five years. Jonas filed a
motion for reduction of sentence with the district court pursuant to I.C.R. 35. Following a
hearing, the district court denied Jonas's motion. Jonas appeals from her judgment of conviction
and sentence, as well as the denial of her Rule 35 motion. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm.
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An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant has the
burden to show that it is unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121
Idaho 385,393,825 P.2d 482,490 (1992). A sentence may represent such an abuse of discretion
if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,645 P.2d
323 ( 1982). A sentence of confinement is reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that
confinement is necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a
given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). Where an
appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, we conduct
an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender and the protection of the public interest. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771,653 P.2d
1183 (Ct. App. 1982).
The record in this case reveals that Jonas has an absolute disregard for the sanctity of
human life. Jonas's current conviction stems from a violent encounter between her ex-husband's
new fiancee and herself. Upon learning that her ex-husband was remarrying, Jonas drove to her
ex-husband's house and shot his fiancee twice in the head with a handgun. Jonas loaded the
body into a pickup, drove to a canal, decapitated the body, and dumped the head and body into
the canal.

At the time she was arrested, police discovered the victim's engagement ring in

Jonas' s pocket.
According to the presentence investigation report (PSI) Jonas has a history of threatening
to kill others, including her mother, son, ex-husband, and ex-husband's former wife. Jonas's
mother told police during the criminal investigation that she feared that Jonas had the potential to
harm others and described Jonas as being a very mean individual. Jonas's ex-husband also
described Jonas as a violent person. Jonas's ex-husband informed the presentence investigator
that Jonas had threatened his life on more than one occasion, and often killed pets that wandered
onto their property and buried them in her pet cemetery across the street. In addition, the PSI
reflects that although Jonas did not deny killing the victim, she denied that the murder was
premeditated and referred to it as an accident.

The presentence investigator noted that the

circumstances surrounding the victim's murder did not support Jonas's version of the crime. The
PSI also describes Jonas as having a history of substance abuse coupled with a borderline
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personality disorder. The PSI further reveals that Jonas has a prior criminal record including
convictions for misdemeanor injury to a child, driving under the influence, firearm in a vehicle,
and interfering with an arrest. During an interview with the presentence investigator, Jonas
admitted to being charged with damaging a police officer's patrol car after she kicked the
officer's radio. Based on the above information, the presentence investigator concluded that
Jonas should be sentenced to the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections.
On appeal, Jonas argues that her sentence is excessive given her mental health history,
her amenability to treatment, the unique circumstances of her case, and her remorse. At the
sentencing hearing, Jonas called two expert witnesses to testify as to her mental health and
amenability to treatment. Although both experts felt that Jonas's borderline personality disorder
was potentially treatable, both experts expressed severe reservations concerning Jonas's ability to
safely re-enter society. The first expert testified that Jonas's treatment would have to occur in a
very confined setting, which would likely require a sizeable period of incarceration. This expert
went on to conclude that Jonas would not be safe to return to society unless she was willing and
able to meet the numerous steps required under her lengthy therapy program. The second expert
voiced similar concerns when discussing Jonas's ability to return to mainstream society. This
expert stated that the success rate for treating borderline personality disorders was relatively low.
He went on to conclude that if Jonas was unable to properly resolve her anger. and her feelings
of victimization, he would be concerned about Jonas's return to the community.
Based on the PSI and the nature of Jonas's offense, the district court made the following
findings at sentencing:
Sandra Jonas has been presented to this Court as a woman with a borderline
personality disorder. The essential feature of borderline personality disorder is a
pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and
affect, marked in impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a
variety of contexts ....
Probation in my opinion is not an option. I'm nervous about parole. It is
clear, as a matter of sentencing policy in Idaho that the primary consideration is
the good order and protection of society, and all other factors must be subservient
to that end .
. . . I think she is presently dangerous. I think she needs treatment. I think
her personality type functions best in a structured environment.
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This is a homicide. It carries the second greatest punishment the law
allows, which is life in prison. A lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness
of the defendant's crime.
Her punishment must fit the crime. Imprisonment is needed to deter her
from doing this again. She has killed an individual in my opinion with little or no
provocation .
. . . I feel that the slap on the wrist for murder might encourage homicides.
You never know how many lives are saved because punishments are harsh. The
punishment for such serious crimes needs to be equally serious .
. . . I find little or at least no provocation for the life ending projectile shot
from the gun of Sandra Jonas .
. . . I do not find that ... Ms. Jones's conduct induced or facilitated the
commission of this crime.
. . . Although she has expressed statements that she is sorry and wished
this would have never happened, she also expressed statements that Meta Jones
pissed her off, and that somehow killing her in some way compares to killing cats.
. . . She needs significant time for such treatment, and even then her
rehabilitation is not assured. We are told that even if she makes significant gains
in the State Penitentiary, upon her release, alcohol abuse can interfere and even
destroy those gains. We are also told that a person with borderline personality
disorders resist alcohol abuse therapy. Is this a gamble that I am willing to take
on behalf of society? No.
The district court fashioned Jonas' s sentence taking into account the four sentencing
objectives of punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society. As the district
court correctly noted, "the primary consideration is, and presumptively always will be, the good
order and protection of society. All other factors are, and must be, subservient to that end."
State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359,363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956). Additionally, the district court
was aware of Jonas's mental illness, her alleged amenability to treatment, the unique
circumstances of her case, and her remorse at the time the sentence was imposed. The district
court addressed each of these factors individually, and at great length, before arriving at an
appropriate sentence based on the facts of this case.
Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that the district court considered all
of the appropriate sentencing factors and carefully weighed the competing interests before
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imposing the sentence in this case. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
Next, we review whether the district court erred in denying Jonas's Rule 35 motion. We
note that an order denying a motion for reduction of a sentence under I.C.R. 35 is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. If the sentence is found to be reasonable at the time of pronouncement,
the defendant must then show that it is excessive in view of the additional information presented
with the motion for reduction. Hernandez, 121 Idaho at 117,822 P.2d at 1014.
Jonas' s Rule 35 motion sought a reduction of sentence on the basis that she had done well
and been productive while incarcerated. Jonas asserts that she has received excellent grades in
her computer and drafting classes and that, due to the detailed mental examinations she has
undergone, she is now more likely to remain on her medication. We have held that although
good conduct while in prison is worthy of consideration, it may not necessarily result in a
reduction of a prisoner's sentence. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,317, 900 P.2d 221,225 (Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Sanchez, 117 Idaho 51, 52, 785 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1990). The
evidence concerning Jonas's good conduct while incarcerated must be viewed in light of the
entire record and may not be an accurate indicator of future conduct in a noncustodial setting.
See Sanchez, 117 Idaho at 52, 785 P .2d at 177. Upon review, we conclude that Jonas has failed

to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 35 motion.
We have reviewed the record and found an abundance of evidence which supports
Jonas's sentence. Therefore, Jonas's judgment of conviction and sentence, as well as the order
denying !.C.R. 35 relief, are affirmed.
Judge LANSING, and Judge SCHWARTZMAN, CONCUR.
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JONAS II

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 30875
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
SANDRA JONAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 344
Filed: January 30, 2006
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Jerome County. Hon. Monte B. Carlson, District Judge.
Order of the district court denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed.
Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Courtney E. Beebe, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge
Sandra Jonas appeals from the district court's order denying her motion to withdraw her
guilty plea. We affirm.

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After Jonas shot and dismembered Meta Marie Jones and enlisted Jonas' seventeen-yearold daughter to help dispose of the body in a canal, Jonas pied guilty to second degree murder
and was sentenced on November 3, 1999.

The judgment of conviction was entered on

November 15, 1999. Jonas appealed her conviction and sentence and, on December 15, 2000,
this Court affirmed both in an unpublished opinion, State v. Jonas, Docket No. 26014 (December
15, 2000). Jonas filed unsuccessful petitions for rehearing and for review. A remittitt.ir was
issued on April 18, 2001.

On October 29, 2001, Jonas filed a motion for new trial under I.C.R. 34 and an affidavit
in support thereof. Subsequently, Jonas filed an alternative motion for leave to withdraw her
guilty plea, along with a memorandum in support thereof, on February 27, 2002.
The district court held two evidentiary hearings on Jonas' motion to withdraw her guilty
plea. The district court considered the evidence presented and, on May IO, 2004, denied Jonas'
motion to withdraw her guilty plea because the district court was not persuaded a manifest
injustice had occurred. Jonas appeals the district court's order.

II.
ANALYSIS

Jonas argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 33(c) 1 motion
to withdraw her guilty plea because, if her plea is not withdrawn, a manifest injustice will result.
The state argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jonas' motion to withdraw
her guilty plea. Issues of jurisdiction present questions of law, over which we exercise free
review. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954, 957 (Ct. App. 1999).
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this jurisdictional issue in State v. Jakoski, 139
Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003). In Jakoski, the Supreme Court held that, without a statute or rule
extending its jurisdiction, a trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires
once the judgment becomes final either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal. In that case, Jakoski pled guilty to assault with intent to commit a serious
felony. After filing an application for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed, Jakoski filed
a Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied Jakoski's motion and
Jakoski appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the district court did not have jurisdiction
to hear Jakoski's Rule 33(c) motion because Jakoski did not appeal his judgment of conviction
and it became final prior to Jakoski filing his Rule 33(c) motion. The Supreme Court explained
that Rule 33(c) does not include a provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the
purpose of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and, therefore, once Jakoski's time to
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states:
Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but
to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.

2

appeal expired, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion. Id. at 355, 79 P.3d at
714.
Jonas was sentenced on November 3, 1999, and the judgment of conviction was entered
on November 15, 1999. This Court affirmed both Jonas' sentence and judgment, and issued a
remittitur on April 18, 2001. Jonas filed her motion to withdraw her guilty plea eleven months
later, on February 27, 2002. Under Jakoski, then, because Jonas was sentenced and this Court
issued a remittitur, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider her motion to withdraw
her guilty plea.
III.
CONCLUSION

Jonas' judgment of conviction became final upon the affirmance of her judgment on
appeal and thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jonas' Rule 33(c) motion, which
she filed eleven months later. Therefore, the district court's order denying Jonas' Rule 33(c)
motion to withdraw her guilty plea is affirmed.
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge LANSING CONCUR.
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JONAS III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35748

SANDRA JONAS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 428
Filed: April 14, 2010
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
OPINION AND SHALL NOT
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State
Jerome County. Hon. Daniel C. Hurlbutt, District Judge.
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVIStON
.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise for appellant.
Order dismissing application for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

PERRY, Judge Pro Tern
Sandra Jonas appeals from the district court's order dismissing her application for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
After Jonas shot and dismembered Meta Marie Jones and enlisted Jonas's seventeenyear-old daughter to help dispose of the body in a canal, Jonas pled guilty to second degree
murder. The district court sentenced Jonas to a unified term of life imprisonment, with a
minimum period of confinement of twenty-five years. This Court affirmed Jonas's judgment of
conviction and sentence. State v. Jonas, Docket No. 26014 (Ct. App. December 15, 2000)
(unpublished). Jonas filed a motion for new trial under I.C.R. 34 and an affidavit in support
thereof. Subsequently, Jonas filed an alternative motion for leave to \Vithdraw her guilty plea,
along with a memorandum in support thereof. After a hearing, the district court denied Jonas's
motion to withdraw her guilty plea because she had failed to show manifest injustice. This Court

1
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affinned on the grounds that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider Jonas's
untimely motion. State v. Jonas, Docket No. 30875 (Ct. App. January 30, 2006) (unpublished).
While the motion to withdraw her guilty plea was pending in the district court, Jonas filed
a verified pro se application for post-conviction relief. The state moved to summarily dismiss
the application, in part, on the ground that it contained nothing but Jonas's bare and conclusory
allegations that were unsupported by any other admissible evidence. After a stay pending the
determination of Jonas's appeal on the denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, Jonas
was appointed counsel and he filed an amended, but unverified, application for post-conviction
relief alleging various conflicts between herself and her trial counsel as well as several grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel which rendered her guilty plea involuntary.

The state

renewed its motion for summary dismissal. The district court summarily dismissed Jonas's
application holding, among other things, that it contained only bare and conclusory allegations.
Jonas appeals.

II.
ANALYSIS

Jonas argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing her application for
post-conviction relief because she raised genuine issues of material fact that she received
ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was involuntary. Additionally, Jonas
argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing her claim that her guilty plea was
involuntary without first affording proper notice.
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding,
governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.3d
476,482 (2008); see also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Like
the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271,
61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). "An application for post-conviction relief differs from a
complaint in an ordinary civil action[.]" Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382
(2004) (quoting Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 PJd at 628)). The application must contain
much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint
under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008); Goodv;in,
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138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not
included with the application. LC.§ 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject
to dismissal.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative.
Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under
I.R.C.P. 56. "A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal ... if the
applicant has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of
the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho
599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) (quoting Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,518,960 P.2d 738,
73 9 (1998)). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the applicant's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must
be conducted. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136; Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at
629.

Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate,

however, even where the state does not controve1i the applicant's evidence because the coU1t is
not required to accept either the applicanfs mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at
136; Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).
On review of dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, we determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho
247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985, 987 (Ct. App.
1993).

However, "while the underlying facts must be regarded as true, the petitioner's

conclusions need not be so accepted." Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069 (quoting
Phillips v. State, 108 Idaho 405,407, 700 P.2d 27, 29 (1985)); see also Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
353,355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). As the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier
of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, summary dismissal is appropriate where the
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evidentiary facts are not disputed, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn
from the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 P.3d at 483; Hayes, 146 Idaho at 355, 195 P.3d at
714. That is, the judge in a post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor
of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.
First we consider Jonas's claim that the district court summarily dismissed her
application for post-conviction relief on grounds different than those alleged by the state's
motion for summary dismissal.

Jonas acknowledges that the state's motion for summary

dismissal and memorandum in support alleged that all of Jonas' s claims failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact, were unsupported by admissible evidence, and were comprised of bare and
conclusory allegations. In its order summarily dismissing Jonas's application, the district court
held, in part, that Jonas "fails to offer any support for her allegations and as such her assertions
are bare and conclusory and this court does not accept them." The district court summarily
dismissed Jonas's application because it contained nothing but bare and conclusory allegations
and failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact Therefore, the district court summarily
dismissed Jonas's application on the same grounds alleged by the state and no additional notice
was required.
Jonas argues that the state was required to specifically identify each of Jonas's claims and
give the reasons why each should be summarily dismissed.

Because the state failed to so

identify Jonas's claim that her guilty plea was involuntary, Jonas argues that she had no notice
and the district court erred by summarily dismissing it. Jonas argues that Buss v. State, 147
Idaho 514, 211 PJd 123 (Ct. App. 2009), supports this proposition. Jonas mischaracterizes the
holding of Buss. In that case, the state's motion asserted that Buss's claims lacked evidentiary
support and then argued why the court should dismiss a particular claim which was not actually
raised by Buss's application, The district court then summarily dismissed Buss's actual claim,
and the majority held that the state's all-inclusive statement followed by a detailed argument of
why a particular claim should be summarily dismissed did not provide notice concerning the
claim that Buss actually raised. Id at 518, 211 P.3d at 127. In this case, the state's motion did
notfocus on a particular claim but, rather, argued why Jonas's entire application was deficient.
It is the applicant's burden to set forth and articulate the claims raised by the application. In a
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case such as this, where the application is a rambling, run-on list of extraordinary allegations and
factual narrative, we will not require the state to decipher the issues it believes the applicant is
trying to raise in its attempt to then address them. Therefore, no further notice was required for
the district court to summarily dismiss Jonas's application on the grounds that were provided by
the broad reasoning in the state's motion for summary dismissal.
Next, we consider Jonas's argument that she raised genuine issues of material fact that
she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that her guilty plea was involuntary.
According to Jonas's unverified amended application, her involuntary guilty plea claim arises
from counsel's ineffectiveness. Thus, these two claims arise out of the same alleged facts and
are in essence the same claim couched in different terms. A claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121
Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attomey' s performance was
deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687~88 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App.
1995). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Where, as here, the defendant was convicted upon a
guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the claimant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. App. 2006).
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel
will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v.

State, 126 Idaho 231, 23 3, 880 P .2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994).
In this case, Jonas attached to her original application for post-conviction relief copies of
pro se briefs as well as a supporting affidavit from her Rule 34 motion to withdraw her guilty
plea. She also argues that her testimony from the hearing on her Rule 34 motion supports her
post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Jonas now presents a laundry list of
factual allegations gleaned from those materials which, she claims, raise a genuine issue of
material fact that counsel was ineffective. However, these pieces of evidence all provide the
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same thing--Jonas's bare and conclusory allegations unsupported by any additional evidence.
The district court is not required to accept such allegations. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873
P.2d at 901. Finally, Jonas argues that the district court bailiff briefly testified at the hearing on
her Rule 34 motion regarding a disagreement with counsel at the change of plea hearing. This
does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective. Therefore,

upon review of Jonas's statements, we conclude the district court did not err by summarily
dismissing Jonas's claims.

III.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not summarily dismiss Jonas's application for post-conviction relief

on grounds different than those raised by the state in its motion for summary judgment. Thus, no
further notice was necessary. Jonas's application and supporting materials contained only bare

and conclusory allegations which the district court was not required to accept. Therefore, the
district court did not err by summarily dismissing Jonas's claims.

Accordingly, the district

court's order dismissing Jonas's application for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary

hearing is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.
Chief Judge LANSING and Judge ORATTON, CONCUR.
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MELANSON, Judge
Sandra Jonas pied guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to a unified term of
life in prison, with a minimum period of confinement oftwenty-five years. Jonas appealed and
this Coi1rt affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Jonas v. St(lte, Docket No. 26014 (Ct. App.
Dec. 15, 2000). Jonas filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court summarily
dismissed the petition and this Court affirmed the dismissal in an unpublished opinion. Jonas v.
State, Docket No. 35748 (Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2010). Jn 2011, Jonas filed a successive petition for

post-conviction relief, which forms the basis of this appeal. The district court issued a notice of
intent to dismiss and appointed counsel. Jonas subsequently filed an amended petition, to which
the state filed a response. 1 Without providing further notice, the district court dismissed the
amended petition, finding Jonas di.d not demonstrate sufficient reason why her claims were

While Jonas's verification signature was not notarized, the district court disregai-ded this
and addressed the merits of Jonas's successive petition.

inadequately raised in her first petition. The district comt also pmvided an alternate ground for
its ruling, addressing the merits of Jonas's ineffective assistance claim. Jonas appeals.
Jonas argues the district co\.1rt erred by dismissing her petition on grounds not articulated
in the notice of intent to dismiss. The state argues that the district comt provided sufficient
notice. The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does not give the paities a
twenty-day notice stating its reasons for doing so as required by I.C. § 19-4906(b). DeRushe v.
State, 146 Idaho 599,602,200 P.3d 1148, 115 l (2009). Likewise, if the state moves to dismiss a
petition under J.C. § 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the
state in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice required by I.C. § 19-4906(b).
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 ldaho 319,322,900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995).
In its notice of intent to dismiss addressing Jonas's original successive petition, the
district court focused upon the factual insufficiencies. The district court did not discuss waiver
under LC. § 19-4908 or explain how Jonas's petition was deficient for failing to articulate
sufficient reason to proceed on a successive petition. However, in the district court's order
dismissing Jonas's successive petition, the district court based its ruling upon waiver under LC.
§ 19-4908.

In suppo1t of its position that adequate notice was provided, the state places emphasis on
the following two sentences in the district court's notice:
In fact, [Jonas] appears to have listed an exceptionally wide array of
claims, some of which she has asserted in prior petitions and motions . . .
supported only by her description of the facts as she sees them.
Thus, [Jonas] does not present adequate grounds upon which to base a
successive application for post-conviction relief.
However, when these sentences are read in the context of the entire notice of intent to dismiss, it
is apparent that wavier under I.C. § 19-4908 is not a ground the district cotut was providing
notice for. Therefore, Jonas did not receive adequate notice and the district comt e1Ted in
dismissing her petition on this ground. 2

2

We do not address the merits of the district court's dismissal on the grounds of waiver
under I.C. § 19-4908 and do not purport to foreclose that possibility after adequate notice is
provided.

2

Next, the state argues that the district court's alternate ruling provides a basis for
affirming because Jonas provided no evidence to support the assettions made in her amended
petition.

Because Jonas never received notice of the alleged deficiencies in her amended

petition, we disagree,
While the district court initially provided notice of its intent to dismiss with respect to
Jonas's original successive petition, Jonas thereafter filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. This amended petition raised facts, claims, and arguments distinct from those
in the original petition to which the district court's notice of intent to dismiss was dit·ected.
Under these circumstances, the district court needed to provide a new notice of intent to dismiss
in order to address these new facts, claims, and arguments and to allow Jonas an opportunity to
reply. 3 The district court failed to provide a new notice following the filing of the amended
petition, Therefore, Jonas did not receive adequate notice under l.C. § l 9-4906(b) and the
district court erred in summarily dismissing the amended petition. Thus, we reverse the order
summarily dismissing Jonas's successive petition and remand to the district comt for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Jonas on
appeal.
Judge LANSING and Judge GRATION, CONCUR.

3

However, this is not to say that a new notice will always be required following the filing
of an amended petition. It will necessarily depend upon the diffel'ences in facts alleged, claims
set forth, and arguments made.
3
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GRATTON, Judge
Sandra Jonas appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of her successive
petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Jonas pied guilty to second degree murder and the district judge imposed a unified life
sentence with twenty-five years determinate.
conviction and sentence.

This Court affirmed Jonas's judgment of

Jonas v. State, Docket No. 26014 (Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2000)

(unpublished). Jonas filed her initial petition for post-conviction relief in 2002, which was
summarily dismissed by the district court, and this Court affirmed the dismissal. Jonas v. State,
Docket No. 35987 (Ct. App. July 26, 2010) (unpublished).

In May 2011, Jonas filed a

successive petition for post-conviction relief, which was also summarily dismissed. On appeal,
this Court reversed, concluding the district court failed to provide adequate notice of the basis of
I

its dismissal. On remand, the district court provided notice of its intent to dismiss the petition,

1

and thereafter summarily dismissed Jonas's successive petition. Jonas now appeals the district
court's second order summarily dismissing her successive petition for post-conviction relief.
Below, Jonas raised eighteen individual claims in her successive petition, all of which
were summarily dismissed. On appeal, Jonas does not raise any issue as to the district court's
decision relative to her claims raised below.

Instead, her appellate brief is a narrative of

complaints with the legal system, her trial attorney, and the district judge unsupported by any
legal argument or authority. Therefore, as argued by the State, Jonas has failed to show any error
by the district court in summarily dismissing her successive petition for post-conviction relief.

See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (A party waives an issue on
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking.). Accordingly, the district court's second order
dismissing Jonas's successive petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.
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